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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Beginning in February 2020, China’s diplomatic
community, together with Chinese provincial and
municipal governments, businesses, and media
outlets, set forth to shape opinions of China in
the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region,
when many in the region had mixed views of
China and its relationship with COVID-19. Over
the next few months, China engaged not only in
the delivery of personal protective equipment
(PPE) and, more recently, vaccines to LAC countries but also launched an extensive messaging
campaign, carried out through traditional and
social media by Chinese embassies and media
outlets across the region.
This report considers China’s varied interests,
whether humanitarian, commercial, or political, when engaging with LAC during the pandemic. Through a review of international media
coverage and Chinese embassy reports, it also
provides some observations on the nature of
Chinese PPE and vaccine-related outreach in
LAC over the past year, and of trends in Chinese
messaging in social and traditional media. Finally, it employs methods such as Twitter mining and sentiment weight analysis to consider
the possible effects of Beijing’s wide-reaching
COVID-19 diplomacy on China’s interests in the
region and on LAC views of China.
China’s COVID-19 diplomacy in LAC was successful in advancing at least some of China’s
interests. China was relatively successful, for
the time being, in using its role as a provider
of vaccines to the region to quell criticism of
China and to influence Taiwan-related policymaking. Recent efforts to isolate Taiwan mark a
clearer than ever departure in LAC from China’s
long-standing policy of noninterference. China’s
decentralized aid campaign also achieved multiple aims. By leveraging wide-ranging actors
and on-the-ground networks, China ensured
extensive LAC and international media coverage
of its assistance. This relatively targeted and
flexible approach also allowed for often-impromptu donations to hard-hit communities, as
well as deliveries to organizations and individuals with some influence over China’s commercial and political interests in LAC.
China’s engagement additionally seemingly helped it avoid an image crisis at the onset

of the pandemic, according to Inter-American
Dialogue analysis of LAC tweets about China
pre- and post-pandemic. As measured by the
language used in China-related posts by LAC
Twitter users from February 2020 to April 2021,
views of China did not measurably worsen as a
result of the pandemic. Nor did region’s overall
views of China noticeably improve during the
pandemic, however, despite China’s widespread
donations, sales, and media outreach. Assertive
and defensive messaging by Chinese embassies, characteristic of its so-called “wolf warrior” diplomacy, featured among China’s communications but did little to garner support for
China in the region. Among LAC’s Twitter users,
at least, views of China, its medical deliveries,
and its broader influence remain mixed.

METHODS AND MOTIVATIONS
China’s engagement with LAC during the global pandemic can be divided into two distinct
phases. The first was evident from February
2020 to around September 2020 and consisted
of sales and donations of medical equipment
and other forms of cooperation and assistance,
such as advisory services and consultations
between medical professionals from China and
LAC nations and cooperation on vaccine testing
and development.1 As a manufacturer of much
of the world’s PPE, China was well-positioned to
deliver its supply to LAC and other regions, especially as COVID-19 cases dwindled at home.2
Based on a review of 470 announcements of
Chinese PPE deliveries announced in Chinese,
Latin American, and other media sources and
Chinese embassy Twitter accounts,3 the pace of
PPE deliveries slowed considerably after summer 2020 (Figure 1), as China focused more
extensively on vaccine development and distribution—the second phase in its COVID-19 outreach. Despite an initially slow start in vaccine
production and distribution,4 China reportedly
distributed 300 million doses of its three vaccines—Sinovac, Sinopharm, and CanSino—by
May 2020, as part of what Chinese President
Xi Jinping described at the 2021 Global Health
Summit as a “large-scale global humanitarian
action.”5 These doses have so far been sold or
donated to 13 LAC countries. As in the distribution of PPE, China was also well positioned
to engage in large-scale vaccine dissemination,
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given sizable Chinese government support for
vaccine development and production6 and an
ability to delay mass vaccination at home.7
FIGURE 1. TRADITIONAL AND SOCIAL MEDIA MENTIONS OF CHINA’S PPE DELIVERIES
TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,
FEBRUARY 2020–MARCH 2021

Source: Media coverage and Chinese embassy reporting; author compilation

China’s prominence in the delivery of COVID-19
assistance to the region—whether through PPE
or vaccine delivery—was the product of more
than just supply-related considerations. The
severity of the coronavirus outbreaks in the
region shaped some of China’s early engagement, for instance. China’s international vaccine
shipment has mostly been based on negotiated
contracts with recipient nations, but Chinese
actors often funneled medical supplies to those
countries most affected by COVID-19. According to the Pontifical University of Chile’s Francisco Urdinez, the number of donations that
each country received was, in general, positively associated with mortality rates during the
first wave of the pandemic.8
In addition to humanitarian motives, frequently
underscored by Chinese officials and supported
at home by the Chinese public,9 China’s pandemic aid and broader economic outreach have
also sought to reinforce and strengthen bilateral ties throughout the region—to ensure, above
all, that China emerges from the pandemic with
its image generally intact, and to simultaneously advance some of China’s commercial objectives and policy interests, including the political
isolation of Taiwan.
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Shaping China’s Image
China’s initial “aid blitz,” carried out by Chinese
companies, embassies, overseas communities,
the Chinese Red Cross, and other actors, occurred at a pivotal moment for global opinion
on China and COVID-19. Critical commentary
was evident in LAC and international media in
the early months of the pandemic, focused on
China’s handling of its outbreak in Wuhan. Peruvian author Mario Vargas Llosa noted in a March
2020 column for Spain’s El País that the virus
had originated in China and that China censored
at least one of the doctors who had originally detected the virus.10 French economist and
political scientist Guy Sorman suggested in an
August 2020 interview with Argentina’s La Nación that “[i]t is ethical and legal to consider the
Chinese regime as directly responsible for this
pandemic.”11 Sorman made similar remarks to
Chile’s El Mercurio.12 By April, anti-China banners appeared in Brasilia reading “China Lied,
People Died,” and “China Virus,” as reported by
the Financial Times.13 Amid mounting criticism
and accusations, China sought to position itself
in LAC and other regions as a responsible actor
and proponent of cooperation at a moment of
global crisis.14
Much of this work fell to China’s embassies,
which, in addition to coordinating donations and
sales of PPE and vaccines, labored throughout
the pandemic to convey approved messages
about China’s experience with COVID-19 and
its pandemic outreach. This was accomplished
through various outlets, including embassy
communiqués, television interviews, press conferences, op-eds authored by Chinese ambassadors and published in local media outlets, and
Twitter posts. In fact, at the request of Beijing,
Chinese embassies in Argentina, the Bahamas,
Cuba, and Peru set up new Twitter accounts in
the early months of the outbreak to communicate key messages directly to local publics.15
Beginning in early January 2020, several Chinese embassies and ambassadors took to
traditional and social media to mostly defend
China against damaging allegations. They communicated confidence in China’s handling of the
outbreak and underscored China’s commitment
to transparency and information sharing. In a
February 14, 2020 interview with Estadão, a daily newspaper published in São Paulo, Chinese
Ambassador Yang Wanming sought to reassure
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Brazilian audiences about China’s control of the
outbreak, the country’s commitment to cooperation with LAC nations, and China’s “interest
in conducting international cooperation in an
open, transparent, and responsible manner.”16
Embassies also tweeted that China was not to
blame for the pandemic,17 and some published
articles lamenting the extent of “prejudice” and
“ignorance” evident in China-related commentary.18 (See Appendix 1 for examples of Chinese
embassy and other government messaging in
January and February 2020.)

ed to address international criticism of China’s
human rights record, whether regarding Hong
Kong, Xinjiang, or China’s domestic response to
COVID-19. On Xinjiang, op-eds and statements
by embassy officials deflected international
condemnations of China’s treatment of the Uighur population, instead pointing to social issues in the United States. Some noted a lack of
protection in the United States of ethnic minorities’ human rights and fundamental freedoms,
referencing death rates among Black Americans
during the pandemic.

By spring 2020, Chinese embassies were still
largely committed to damage control, addressing continued critiques of China’s COVID-19
response (e.g., that China tried to cover up infections or that China’s lockdown in Wuhan violated its citizens’ human rights) and conveying
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)-produced
talking points. China’s Embassy in Ecuador was
especially dedicated to this approach, using
hashtags like “#LaVerdad” (#TheTruth) when
countering specific claims about China and
COVID-19.19 Embassies also emphasized China’s
interest in cooperation and friendship, highlighting donations and sales of PPE by Chinese
actors. In May, Chinese ambassadors penned
op-eds with such titles as “Defeating COVID-19
through Solidarity and Cooperation,”20 “Solidariedade e cooperação: armas mais poderosas para derrotar a pandemia” (“Solidarity and
cooperation: more powerful weapons to defeat
the pandemic”)21 and “Pompeo: El Mentiroso
(“Pompeo: The Liar”).

On the topic of human rights, Chinese embassies in Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Grenada, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and
Uruguay used their websites, social media, and
interviews to comment on China’s rights-related achievements, employing language from
a July 2020 MOFA article titled “What’s False
and What’s True on China-related Human
Rights Matters.”25 In August 2020, another article, “Fact check: Pompeo’s fact-twisting China
speech versus the truth,” was circulated by Chinese embassies in LAC. 26 Both articles argued
that China’s successes in containing COVID-19
demonstrated its unfailing commitment to human rights.

A spike in Caribbean-directed messaging was
evident in April 2020, when Chinese embassies
addressed allegations by Human Rights Watch22
and former Barbados diplomat Mohammed
Iqbal Degia that the Chinese city of Guangzhou
had targeted its African communities, forcibly
testing them for COVID-19 and ordering them
to self-isolate. Reports also surfaced at the
time of evictions of African residents. Chinese
embassies in Barbados and Dominica published statements refuting these claims, citing
China’s history of cooperation with African nations.23 Degia’s op-ed on the topic appears to
have been removed from the NationNews website where it was first published, likely at the
request of the Barbados government, as one
interviewee noted.24
By summer 2020, embassy messaging expand-

Foreign Minister Wang Yi further promoted China’s “people-centered” definition of human
rights during the 46th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2021. There he
noted that a government’s focus on “people’s
sense of gains, happiness and security” is the
“the fundamental pursuit of human rights.” According to this formulation, as The Diplomat editor Shannon Tiezzi has noted, economic prosperity tops the list of priorities, and the concept
of “happiness” replaces more concrete markers
like racial and gender equality or freedom of
religion. Security is also elevated to a human
rights priority.27
Isolating Taiwan
The political isolation of Taiwan was yet another objective of China’s COVID-19 outreach over
the past year, as China sought to curry favor
with Taiwan’s allies and reinforce ties to countries such as Guyana, where Taiwan had made
diplomatic overtures. China’s efforts in this area
marked a clear departure from its foreign policy
claims of noninterference.
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In most cases, China’s pandemic-era influence
on Taiwan’s allies has been indirect. Throughout the pandemic, Chinese PPE donations and
vaccine sales were directed nearly exclusively
to countries with diplomatic ties to China. This
led some in the region to question their political
allegiances. According to the Financial Times,
Carlos Alberto Madero, Honduras’s chief cabinet coordinator, said that access to vaccines
was “much more urgent than anything else,”
including a continued alliance with Taiwan.28
Others sought a “diplomatic bridge” to Beijing—a prerequisite for vaccine sales.29 In May
2021, Honduras reported that the government
of El Salvador might assist in vaccine negotiations with China.30 A Paraguayan industry group
known as the Agricultural Coordinator requested help from Beijing in mid-April through a series of letters to China’s MOFA and the Chinese
ambassador in Brazil.31
In other cases, vaccines have seemingly been
used to reward or discourage government decision-making on Taiwan and other matters.
The timing of a vaccine donation to Guyana led
some to speculate that the Caribbean nation
was rewarded with the doses after deciding to
close a new Taiwanese commercial office.32 And
in Brazil, China reportedly halted the shipment
of raw materials necessary for the São Paulo-based Butantan Institute to produce China’s
CoronaVac vaccine33 after Brazilian President
Bolsonaro suggested that China disseminated
COVID-19 as a tactic of biological warfare.34
Commercial Objectives
Many Chinese companies, from large tech conglomerates to smaller-scale construction firms,
assisted LAC during the pandemic. For the many
companies involved in China’s international
outreach, the pandemic, while problematic for
their global operations, was also an opportunity
to showcase their capabilities to foreign audiences or demonstrate their commitment to the
countries and communities where they work.
Indeed, instances of PPE donations by Chinese companies were most extensive in those
countries where Chinese companies maintain
a far-reaching presence, where ties need reinforcement, or where Chinese firms have sought
to establish a more prominent footprint.
Donation announcements by Chinese companies were most evident in Panama, which
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arguably falls into all three categories. Panama has been a priority destination for Chinese
companies for more than a decade, having
been featured in Chinese Ministry of Commerce
“going-out” guides since 2010. It received renewed attention from Chinese investors after
cutting ties with Taiwan in 2017, but some Chinese projects have been suspended under the
Laurentino Cortizo government—the product
of enhanced legal scrutiny, problems associated with project contracts, and the adverse effects of the pandemic, according to China-Latin
America relations expert Evan Ellis.35 Amid the
pandemic and persistent political uncertainties,
Chinese companies have underscored their
commitment to the country through donations
and other forms of assistance. Huawei alone
made at least seven different donations of various sizes to Panamanian government offices
and communities between March and September 2020.
Argentina was also a primary recipient of Chinese company donations, at a moment when
China-Argentina economic and political ties
are strengthening. Several new projects have
been announced in Argentina under the Alberto Fernández government, including China
Machinery Engineering Corporation’s investment in a train car production facility in Santa
Fe, Argentina; the approval of Phases 4 and 5
of its Cauchari Solar project; and talk of a China-financed gas pipeline running from the Vaca
Muerta shale field in Argentina to Brazil. With
current and future operations in mind, the following Chinese companies donated to Argentina early in the pandemic: construction firm
Gezhouba, which is partially responsible for
building the Condor Cliff and Barrancosa dams
in Santa Cruz; Bank of China and ICBC; Huawei;
China Railway Engineering Corporation and China Railway Construction Corporation, which are
upgrading the Belgrano Cargas and other rail
networks; and Alibaba.
Chinese companies were also active in PPE
distribution in Brazil, where China’s economic interests are extensive and growing. Firms
such as Gree Electric, which sells electronic
appliances in the country; Trip.com, a Chinese
travel website; and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which provided finance for
the Port San Luis expansion and Jupia and Ilha
Solteira acquisitions, made donations to Brazil
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amid the pandemic.36 In the case of Brazil, Chinese companies may see value in highlighting
their commitment to Brazilian communities at a
moment of relative volatility in China-Brazil relations. Some donations to Brazil through sister
cities/provinces networks made explicit reference to the countries’ strained relations—they
arrived in boxes labeled “[w]e stay together
through storms and tensions.”37
For China’s tech firms, the pandemic also provided an opportunity to showcase new biomedical technologies and artificial intelligence-enabled diagnostic capabilities. LAC and other
developing regions are critical markets for China’s major tech and telecommunications companies, especially as Huawei and others face
obstacles in Australia, Europe, and the United
States. Huawei, in particular, has sought to diversify its offerings in LAC, including in the area
of medical technologies, in anticipation of possible obstacles to 5G equipment sales.38 During
the pandemic, Huawei donated computerized
imaging solutions to the Dominican Republic,39
and Huawei and Huiying Medical Technology
Co., Ltd. offered AI-enabled auxiliary diagnostic
systems to hospitals in Ecuador.40 The former
vice-president of Ecuador, Otto Sonnenholzner,
thanked Huawei on Twitter in March 2020, noting that Ecuador had become the first country
in Latin America to have AI-enabled diagnostics
in two local hospitals.41
The pandemic has also amounted to something
of an international debut for China’s pharmaceutical companies. In addition to co-producing
some vaccines and treatments and holding trials in LAC and other regions, China’s three vaccine manufacturers became household names
in LAC as Chinese vaccines were administered
across the region. Regional views of China’s
biomedical capability will largely be determined by the efficacy of its vaccines, but the
linkages developed between Chinese and Latin American pharmaceutical companies will be
productive beyond the pandemic. Vaccine trials
and research were conducted with Fundación
Huésped in Argentina and the Butantan Institute in Brazil. In addition, Interferon Alfa-2B, an
antiviral treatment produced by Cuban-Chinese
joint venture Changheber, was among the medicines selected by the Chinese National Health
Commission to fight COVID-19 infections in China.42

“WOLF WARRIORS” IN LAC?
“Wolf warrior” diplomacy, a term derived from
a top-grossing Chinese film franchise of the
same name, refers to an aggressive style of diplomacy adopted by Chinese diplomats in recent years. Sharp-edged messaging from Chinese diplomats featured prominently in China’s
global communications in the early months of
the pandemic, with examples evident in the
LAC region. The use of razor-sharp, defensive
messaging in LAC was more extensive in some
countries than others, however. Some ambassadors engaged in heated exchanges on Twitter
and other social media platforms, while others
avoided confrontations.
To better understand the nature and extent of
wolf warrior-type messaging in LAC, our team
of researchers developed a database of posts
from Chinese embassy Twitter accounts in LAC
from February 2020 to March 2021. Chinese
embassies in LAC posted about 11,000 tweets
during the pandemic, approximately 1,635 of
which directly referenced COVID-19. Each of
the covid-specific tweets was reviewed and divided into five categories:
(1) PPE delivery announcements.
(2) Vaccine-specific commentary.
(3) Tweets conveying positive messages about
China’s engagement with the region amid the
pandemic, such as noting China’s commitment
to cooperation with LAC, Beijing’s effective response to the pandemic, or China’s dedication
to addressing the region’s pandemic-related
challenges.
(4) Wolf warrior-type messaging, strongly countering criticism of China or expressing critical
views of the United States or other nations’
pandemic responses and outreach.
(5) Other COVID-19 related announcements and
messages, including statistics about China’s
outbreaks.
Once the pandemic-related tweets were categorized, we examined the frequency of the
five types of messaging in three LAC nations—
Brazil, Ecuador, and Grenada—where China’s
broader economic and covid-era relations varied considerably.
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In general, the embassies’ total promotional
tweets exceeded their negative or defensive
ones or those that condemned other countries’
practices. But spikes in negative and assertive messaging were nevertheless evident in all
three countries. Negative tweets were generally
posted in response to international criticisms of
China or as a reaction to claims made by public
figures in LAC nations. They also occasionally
followed strongly worded, official statements
by high-ranking Chinese diplomats or officials
about China’s COVID-19 response, with diplomats echoing Beijing’s key points in their host
countries. Chinese diplomats’ most combative
rhetoric was also evident at a moment in time
(spring-summer 2020) when China’s so-called
“wolf warrior” diplomats were reportedly given
some leeway to defend China aggressively and
even propagate conspiracy theories through
media platforms.43
Of the three countries studied—Brazil, Ecuador, and Grenada—wolf warrior-type messaging appeared most frequently in Brazil. There,
spikes in hard-hitting messaging, as evident in
March 2020 (Figure 2), mostly followed critical
comments made by Brazilian public officials.
For example, when Eduardo Bolsonaro, Brazilian
federal deputy and son of President Jair Bolsonaro, blamed China and its model of government for the pandemic in a March tweet,44 the
Chinese embassy in Brasilia took to Twitter to
suggest the younger Bolsonaro had contracted a “mental virus” during a trip to the United
States. The increase in defensive messaging in
May 2020 corresponded with a speech by Wang
Yi that noted China’s commitment to addressing
the pandemic while also referencing U.S. efforts
to politicize COVID-19.45 The embassy tweeted
strongly-worded snippets from Wang’s address.
That month, the Chinese Embassy in Brazil also
published op-eds defending China against allegations that COVID-19 originated in a lab in Wuhan and that China was not transparent when
handling its domestic outbreak.
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FIGURE 2. TYPES OF PANDEMIC-ERA MESSAGING BY CHINA’S EMBASSY IN BRAZIL,
FEBRUARY 2020-MARCH 2021

Source: Chinese embassy Twitter accounts; author compilation

Positive and promotional tweets from the Chinese embassy in Ecuador far exceeded negative ones, but spikes in negative and defensive
tweets were nevertheless evident in May and
June 2020 (Figure 3). Nearly every day in May
and June, Ecuador’s diplomats addressed what
they labeled false claims about China’s handling
of COVID-19, using the hashtag #LaVerdad. They
addressed rumors about Chinese people eating
bats, allegations that Wuhan ophthalmologist Li
Wenliang had denounced China’s actions and
was arrested, reports that China was reopening
its wet markets, and claims that the Wuhan Institute of Virology was the source of the virus.
Other messaging in May focused on defending
the World Health Organization (WHO), following
U.S. doubts about its political neutrality. China’s
embassy in Ecuador tweeted, “In the face of the
virus, those who harass and blackmail the WHO
lack a minimum human spirit, and will be rejected by the international community.”46
A defensive December 2020 post from the Chinese Embassy in Ecuador regarded an official
communiqué issued by Ecuador’s Ministry of
Foreign Relations and Human Mobility. The
communiqué strongly refuted a Global Times
claim that the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan
may have resulted from cold food chain deliveries from Ecuador and other countries.47
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The Chinese Embassy responded with its own
communiqué and tweeted the following: “#IMPORTANT | We publish our Official Communiqué
on the traceability of COVID-19; since, only scientific research will demonstrate the transmission route of the coronavirus to prevent future
risks and ensure global health.”48
FIGURE 3. TYPES OF PANDEMIC-ERA MESSAGING BY CHINA’S EMBASSY IN ECUADOR,
FEBRUARY 2020-MARCH 2021

Source: Chinese embassy Twitter accounts; author compilation

FIGURE 4. TYPES OF PANDEMIC-ERA MESSAGING BY CHINA’S EMBASSY IN GRENADA,
FEBRUARY 2020-MARCH 2021

Source: Chinese embassy Twitter accounts; author compilation

Efforts to (sometimes forcefully) defend China
on Twitter were also evident in other parts of
the region. Even in Peru, where bilateral relations are generally strong, Chinese diplomats
traded barbs with Vargas Llosa after the Nobel
Prize-winning writer published his previously
referenced El País op-ed. In the article, Vargas
Llosa suggested the coronavirus had originated
in China and noted that a free and democratic
society would have handled the crisis differently. The Chinese Embassy in Lima responded on
the Chinese social media platform WeChat, reducing Vargas Llosa’s analysis to a “smear”
campaign, which, according to the post, reflected “a lack of understanding and serious
prejudice against China.”49 The author’s books
were also reportedly removed from major Chinese e-book platforms.50 In other cases, China
and allies in LAC have endorsed each other’s
critiques of third parties. For example, through
English-language media outlets and Twitter,
Chinese media and Cuban officials blamed U.S.
sanctions for delays in shipments of Chinese
supplies to Havana.51
Embassies’ defensive tweets also varied in
tone, suggesting that the embassies and ambassadors were afforded a degree of flexibility
when delivering messages. The embassy and
ambassador collectively issued fewer critical
tweets in Grenada, but the embassy’s tone was
nevertheless harsher than in Brazil and Ecuador. The Chinese Embassy of Grenada’s defensive messaging in March was mostly aimed at
refuting claims of mistreatment of African migrants in Guangzhou (Figure 4), but diplomats
also labeled former U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo a politician committed to “slandering
diplomacy,” quoting MOFA spokesperson and
emblematic wolf warrior Zhao Lijian’s remarks
about U.S. efforts to lift restrictions on official
contact with Taiwan.52
Ambassador to Grenada Zhao Yongchan’s
tweets also used particularly strong language.
They read as far more critical than Ambassador Yang Wanming’s in Brazil, for example, despite the prevalence of derogatory statements
about China in Brazil, often coming from Jair
Bolsonaro himself. Ambassador Zhao noted, for
instance, that “[t]he West is containing China,
awakening China’s memory of enslaving China
by imperialists for 100 yrs,”53 and, in September 2020, that China defeated the pandemic in three months, but the United States was
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not able to do so after nine.54 In Ecuador, by
contrast, Ambassador Chen Guoyou refrained
from tweeting, though Ecuador embassy tweets
frequently referenced his public commentary.
In all three countries, China’s Twitter-based
condemnations were accompanied by a proportionate increase in positive messaging, with
China evidently seeking to balance its more assertive outreach with positive information on
Chinese cooperation.
China’s more aggressive posts had tapered off
by summer 2020, lending some credence to
Bates Gill’s summer 2020 claim that China’s
diplomats were reined in as the party understood it had overreached with many audiences around the world.55 More recently, in a June
2021 speech to the Politburo study session,
Xi signaled a possible throttling of wolf warrior-type outbursts, calling on the country’s
leaders to engender a “trustworthy, lovable,
and respectable” image for China. 56 Xinhua later suggested that the country adopt a “humble”
approach in relations with the outside world.57
The party may very well have noted, as a Yale
University study did, that the aggressive messaging associated with wolf warrior diplomacy
was not as effective as promotional messaging
in moving public opinion on China.58
Whether China’s wolf warrior diplomacy persists or not, its embassies in LAC now appear
committed to delivering a message of solidarity, multilateralism, and cooperation, referencing
China’s commitment to COVID-19 collaboration.
At the time of this report’s publication, Chinese
embassy Twitter accounts in the region mostly were conveying vaccine-related information
and positive or promotional messages.

DECENTRALIZED

DIPLOMACY

Much of China’s COVID-19 diplomacy was
carried out at the central government level
through “cloud diplomacy” or virtual meetings
with heads of state or other high-level officials.
These virtual communications were lauded by
Wang Yi as the “biggest highlight in China’s
foreign relations,”59 noting that, in 2020, Xi Jinping’s “cloud diplomacy” included 87 meetings
and phone calls with foreign leaders and heads
of international organizations, along with vir-
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tual attendance in 22 bilateral or multilateral
events.60
Except for some provincial level and other collaboration, including vaccine production efforts
in São Paulo state, China’s vaccine diplomacy
has also mainly been carried out at the central
government level through contracts negotiated
by Chinese vaccine companies and LAC health
ministries,61 or through donations to LAC governments. Venezuela’s government received
500,000 donated vaccines from China in March
2021, for instance.62
By contrast, China’s early-stage (February
2020-September 2020) pandemic outreach
was notably decentralized. It entailed loosely
coordinated engagement by wide-ranging Chinese actors, including embassies, companies,
provincial government authorities, networks of
overseas Chinese communities, and quasi-governmental organizations, such as the Chinese
Red Cross (see Table 1). The latter donated
US$100,000 worth of supplies to Colombia,
gave US$100,000 in cash to Cuba,63 and provided some hurricane and pandemic-related
assistance to El Salvador. These actors operated in broad support of China’s diplomatic
objectives and engaged the region through distinct and sometimes ad hoc channels. As Urdinez described it, China’s mask diplomacy was
“a hodgepodge of actions by a diverse cast of
Chinese donors rather than the centralized outgrowth of a unitary national policy.”64
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TABLE 1. EXAMPLES OF CHINESE ACTORS INVOLVED IN CHINA’S COVID-19 DIPLOMACY IN
LAC
Provincial/Municipal
Governments

Quasi-Governmental/United
Front

Chengdu city government
Guangdong provincial
government
Guangzhou city government
Guizhou provincial
government
Guiyang city government
Fengtai city government
Fujian provincial government
Fuzhou city government
Gansu provincial government
Hangzhou city government
Jiangmen city government
Jiangsu provincial
government
Nanchang city government
Nanjing city government
Meizhou city government
Ningxia provincial
government
Shanghai city government
Shanxi provincial
government
Shenzhen city government
Sichuan provincial
government
Suzhou city government
Xiamen city government
Xi’an city government
Zhongshan city government

China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade

Companies

Alibaba
Bank of China

Beijing Dajia
China People’s Asso- Information
ciation for Friendship Technology
with Foreign CounCompany
tries
CCCC
Chinese Red Cross
Chery
China SDIC
CPC International
Trade
Department
China Three
Gorges
China Journalist
CITIC
Association
CMOC Brazil
CNPC
China People’s Asso- COSCO
ciation for Friendship CREC
with Foreign CounCRCC
Didi Chuxing
tries
Gezhouba
Gree Electric
Huawei
Hikvision
ICBC
Microport
Nuctech Panama
PetroChina
Qingyuan
Sinograin
State Grid Brazil
TikTok
Tencent
Trip.com
Wanhuida
XCMG
Yili
Yutong

Zhuhai Enterprise
ZTE

Source: Chinese embassy Twitter accounts; author compilation

China’s largest companies, state-owned and
private, were among the first Chinese actors
to deliver PPE in parts of the region, often in
countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru,
where Chinese companies have considerable
commercial interests (see the Commercial Objectives section). These companies managed
localized campaigns in many cases, donating
various items to different authorities and organizations in other LAC countries. Chinese tech
conglomerate Alibaba and telecommunications

giant Huawei made frequent donations to LAC
national governments. Chinese multinational Alibaba and founder Jack Ma’s private foundation
donated five ventilators to Peru,65 15,000 test
kits and 30,000 face masks to Antigua and
Barbuda,66 and respirators and other equipment to Argentina, for example. Huawei donated 150,000 face masks to Colombia in March.
These companies operated in broad support of
Chinese government objectives but with considerable autonomy.
Chinese companies have also delivered supplies
directly to LAC cities and provinces, prioritizing
areas with high rates of COVID-19 infection or
those where they operate. Huawei Brazil’s donation of 30 ventilators to communities in Brazil’s
Amazon region was clearly need-based—the
Amazon was especially hard-hit in the country’s
second covid wave.67 Porto São Luis, managed
by China Communications Construction Company, donated 10,000 surgical masks to the Maranhão State Department of Public Health.68 State
Grid Brazil, which owns much of Brazil’s electricity grid, donated 264 hospital beds to Rio de
Janeiro.69 And in Argentina, Chinese companies
Gezhouba, China Railway, and Shandong Gold
Group donated to Argentine provinces where
they have existing operations, such as Santa
Cruz, San Luis, and San Juan.70
With hundreds of “touch points,” this decentralized approach to PPE donation ensured considerable coverage of China’s efforts in LAC.
By employing on-the-ground networks, China
was also able to engage quickly and directly
with hard-hit communities. China’s strategy of
PPE distribution may additionally strengthen
or solidify Chinese ties to select organizations
and influential individuals in LAC. Chinese entities donated not only to first responders but
also to those in a position to advance China’s
commercial (or other) interests in the region.
According to one interviewee, customs officials
in Panama were the direct recipients of PPE deliveries,71 just as free trade agreement negotiations between the two countries stalled.72 The
International Liaison Department of the Chinese
Communist Party also donated directly to Panama’s Democratic Revolutionary Party in July
2020.73 In Bolivia, PPE was provided to the Bolivian military.74 In Peru and Ecuador, donations
were made to police forces. China Communications Construction, COFCO Argentina, and Bank
of China in Argentina donated supplies to police
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forces.75 Donations, including a telecommunications platform, were also made by Huawei and
the Chinese embassy to Peru’s Ministry of the
Interior.76 In addition to overseeing police and
other frontline workers, LAC interior ministries
frequently sign off on the importation of Chinese security systems.77
Although many Chinese actors were engaged
in China’s early outreach, Chinese embassies
refereed much of China’s initial COVID-19 aid
in LAC while also documenting China’s engagement on their websites and social media
accounts. The Chinese embassy coordinated
nearly all the donations tracked in Grenada (see
“Wolf Warriors” in LAC?” section), and in most
other Caribbean nations, except for the Bahamas, Barbados, and Cuba, where Chinese municipal governments, overseas Chinese communities, student networks, and companies
also played a central role. Donations from Jack
Ma and the Alibaba Foundation were also especially prominent in Caribbean. Embassies also
played a critical coordinating role elsewhere in
the region. The Chinese embassy managed four
separate deliveries and donations to Bolivia
between September 2020 and February 2021.
China’s embassy in Colombia was also responsible for several donations, though it appeared
to focus its efforts on local communities, sending 2.4 tons of food to vulnerable families in La
Guajira.78
The role of Chinese embassies as hubs for deliveries was less evident in Chile, as Urdinez
noted.79 Urdinez found that donations from
China to Chile from February 11, 2020, to June
10, 2020, were channeled through three main
hubs, reflecting the sometimes ad hoc nature
of China’s early outreach. Almost 98 percent
arrived through the Chilean Embassy in Beijing,
including donations from Chinese companies
and foundations. Meanwhile, Chinese provinces and city-to-city donations made up just 2
percent of the total donations (Figure 4). The
Chinese Embassy in Santiago was the leastused channel, responsible for just 0.5 percent
of total Chinese donations to Chile.80 In fact,
Urdinez argued that in the case of Chile, “the
relationship between the Chinese Embassy in
Santiago and the Chilean government ended up
being more of an obstacle than a boost to the
success of China’s mask diplomacy in Chile.”81
This was the result of miscommunication and
ensuing controversy (termed “ventilator-gate”)
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about ventilator deliveries between the Chinese
and the Chilean Ministry of Health. As a result
of the incident, China’s Ambassador to Chile, Xu
Bu, stepped down in October 2020.
Sister city and province linkages, which have
been exceedingly productive avenues for Chinese commercial and cooperative engagement
with LAC,82 were also used amid the pandemic,
facilitating the delivery of medical supplies from
China to LAC. Fuzhou and Dongguan, China,
both sister cities of Campinas, Brazil, donated
80,000 face masks to Campinas in April 2020.83
China’s Guizhou province, linked to Argentina’s
Jujuy province since 2017, sent 9,000 face
masks to Jujuy before July 2020.84 In other cases, cities and provinces in China have shipped
equipment to Chinese embassies in LAC or directly to LAC governments (sometimes through
LAC embassies in China, as Urdinez noted) for
broader distribution. For example, Chongqing in
central China delivered 1,000 protective suits,
1,000 surgical suits, and 5,400 N95 masks to
Ecuador in early April, according to China’s embassy there. Suzhou, in China’s Jiangsu province, donated 20,000 face masks and 200
hazmat suits to Panama’s government later that
same month. And Nanjing donated 30,000 face
masks to Colombia.85
Overseas Chinese communities and associations also facilitated PPE distribution in LAC
countries. Their activities were reflective of the
decentralized but still semi-coordinated nature
of China’s early outreach. The Chinatown community in Bogotá reportedly donated food to
needy families. Members of El Salvador’s Chinese community contributed 3,000 face masks
and other supplies to the country’s national police, according to a Twitter post from the local
Chinese embassy.86 The Chinese community in
Venezuela also donated equipment to certain
Venezuelan localities in mid-April. The Chinese media reported that alumni from Cuban
universities donated more than 58,000 face
masks to the Cuban people.87 Some of these
activities were likely planned by the communities themselves, without the Chinese government’s involvement. Others received support
from local Chinese missions, with embassies
highlighting these efforts as part of their media outreach.88 Some Chinese civil society organizations in LAC are closely linked to China.
Jin Jiachi, president of the Zhonghua Business
Association in Mexico, organized the delivery
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of 15,000 face masks to the Mexican government in April 2020.89 Jin was one of four Chinese individuals in Mexico named in 2018 as
members of the 10th Committee of the Chinese
Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese.90

THE EFFECTS OF CHINA’S
PANDEMIC-ERA OUTREACH
Of interest at this point in the pandemic is the
effect of China’s approach to coronavirus outreach on LAC infection rates as the virus continues to surge in parts of the region, on views of
China, and on China’s political and commercial
objectives (as outlined in previous sections).
The effect of China’s early donations and sales
of medical equipment on COVID-19 outcomes
in the region is still difficult to discern. Chinese
supplies benefitted certain countries, communities, and targeted individuals but ranged
considerably in scale and importance, with
some countries receiving high-tech equipment,
such as ventilators, and others receiving basic
protective attire. China’s vaccine-related outreach could have a far more profound effect on
COVID-19 outcomes in the region, despite some
variation in efficacy rates among the country’s
three vaccines and the possibility that new variants will render China’s vaccines less effective.
A Chinese mRNA vaccine that had a late-stage
human trial in Mexico in May could prove more
effective than China’s existing vaccines in preventing serious illness.91
LAC views of China and its coronavirus outreach are also difficult to gauge, given the pandemic’s limitations on public opinion polling.
One Caribbean-based interviewee suggested
that China’s media outreach has had little effect on regional views of China. And a Mexican
interviewee with ties to local media suggested that Chinese ambassador op-eds, whether
about COVID-19 or other topics are barely read
at all.92 Indeed, most Chinese embassy Twitter
accounts have few followers. China’s medical
outreach has likely been more impactful on the
region’s overall views of China. China’s vaccine
sales were critical for many countries in the region, especially considering that access to U.S.
vaccines was still relatively limited at the time
of this report’s publication. And China’s timely
deliveries were regarded positively by most in

LAC, although concerns about the efficacy of
Chinese vaccines could complicate the region’s
vaccination plans.93
China’s PPE deliveries were also met with gratitude, although some in the region indicated
concern about the quality and cost of Chinese
PPE shipments. Mexican officials noted that
much of the equipment they purchased from
China was the same equipment they had sold
to China early in the pandemic and that Mexico repurchased the equipment at a much higher price.94 In Argentina, some diagnostic tests
for COVID-19 were deemed ineffective by the
country’s Ministry of Science.95
Based solely on analysis of LAC Twitter posts,
China’s wide-reaching medical outreach does
not appear to have significantly impacted
overall views of China in the region, however.
To assess LAC views of China during the pandemic, Inter-American Dialogue researchers
used R-based data mining96 to gather tweets
within a 2,500-mile radius from the coordinates -15.6006, -56.1004, which correspond
to Cuiabá, Brazil, an approximate geographic
center of South America, encompassing Twitter
users from across Latin America and the Caribbean. A search for tweets posted from February
2020 to April 2021 including the word “China”
was run using these parameters. We then applied Julia Silge and David Robinson’s text mining tools97 to parse tweets into monograms (single words) and generated a list of the top 200
most frequently-used words. The 200 words
represented in the word cloud below (Figure 3)
, and are weighted according to the frequency
with which LAC Twitter users employed them.
To determine possible shifts in views of China
among Twitter users pre- and post-pandemic,
we performed the same search for tweets posted between October 2018 and January 2020 or
the 14 months preceding the pandemic (Figure
2).
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FIGURE 2. TERMS THAT APPEARED WITH
GREATEST FREQUENCY IN LAC TWEETS REFERENCING “CHINA,” OCTOBER 2018–FEBRUARY
2020
(PRE-COVID-19)

FIGURE 3. TERMS THAT APPEARED WITH
GREATEST FREQUENCY IN LAC TWEETS REFERENCING “CHINA,” FEBRUARY 2020–APRIL
2021 (AMID THE PANDEMIC)

We noted a substantial overall increase in LAC
tweets about China amid the pandemic, perhaps suggesting that the region’s Twitter users
viewed China as having a more substantial impact on LAC affairs during the pandemic. Before
the pandemic, 41,098 geo-referenced tweets
mentioned China. More than three times as
many (144,181 tweets) referenced China during
the pandemic, though many came from official
Chinese sources and possibly also from bots.
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However, it is difficult to know whether LAC
Twitter users viewed China especially positively
or negatively. The terms used in these tweets
were fairly neutral—not strongly positively or
negatively weighted, according to the Technical
University of Denmark’s AFINN Lexicon Dictionary and the NRC Word-Association Lexicon,
published by Saif Mohammad and Peter Turney.98
Unsurprisingly, tweets referencing China during
the pandemic focused to a considerable degree
on COVID-19 and China’s vaccines, whereas
tweets posted before the pandemic focused
more extensively on the U.S.-China trade war,
presumably, with the “U.S.” (EUA), “Trump,” and
“war” (guerra) featuring among the top ten
most used words. Communist (comunista) also
featured among the leading 15 words in both
data sets. It was used more than 1,000 times in
geo-referenced tweets about China pre-covid
and more than 5,000 times in tweets posted
during the pandemic.
To gauge views of Chinese vaccines, we also
mined Twitter for posts using the words “vacuna china” and “vacina chinesa” between February 2020 and April 2021. Spanish-language
tweets about “vacuna china” were not strongly
emotionally weighted—positively or negatively. However, some negatively-weighted words,
such as “shit,” “guinea pigs,” and “fear,” featured among the top 200 words used in Portuguese-language tweets about Chinese vaccines
(Figure 4). São Paulo Governor João Doría was
also mentioned with considerable frequency—more than 600 times from February 2020
to April 2021, reflecting domestic political tensions in Brazil’s vaccine-related planning and
acquisition. Doría was responsible for coordinating much of the country’s vaccine-related
cooperation with China.
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FIGURE 4. TERMS THAT APPEARED WITH
GREATEST FREQUENCY IN LAC TWEETS REFERENCING “VACUNA CHINA” AND “VACINA
CHINESA,” FEBRUARY 2020–APRIL 2021
(AMID
THE
PANDEMIC)

China’s broader political gains are more difficult
to measure at this phase. Engagement with El
Salvador in Central America, and Uruguay and
Argentina in South America, was pursued at
moments of political opportunity. China-El Salvador ties have noticeably strengthened in recent months, whether as a result of covid-related outreach or not.99 In May 2021, El Salvador’s
Legislative Assembly approved an agreement
for enhanced non-pandemic-related commercial cooperation with China, allowing for the use
of Chinese labor and equipment in future deals.
Yet, medical donations aside, China’s political
leverage is already extensive in the region. Regardless of whether China helps the region with
additional PPE shipments and vaccine sales,
China’s extensive economic ties will continue to
affect LAC government decision-making.

CONCLUSION
The effects of China’s outreach may be more
striking in the commercial realm, to the extent
that Chinese companies have indeed solidified
or forged new ties amid the pandemic. China-LAC biomedical cooperation has boomed,
generating linkages between Chinese researchers and companies and key facilities across the
region. The perceived value of China’s “health
silk road” is likely boosted by China’s success in
containing COVID-19 and its interest in cooperating with the Global South on medical tech
development.
Any benefits to Chinese companies from their
extended outreach would take considerable
time to materialize, however, and will undoubtedly vary on a company-by-company basis. LAC
Twitter users referenced Huawei fewer times
during the pandemic (5,376 tweets) than before
(7,870 tweets), despite the company’s rather
robust pandemic outreach. As Financial Times
Latin America Editor Michael Stott noted at a
May 2021 Inter-American Dialogue event, neither China nor U.S.-China competition (nor Huawei, for that matter) are foremost for most in
LAC at this juncture. LAC leaders, in most cases,
are seeking critical coronavirus solutions, regardless of their source. This is certainly true of
Taiwan’s allies, too, though contributions from
India, Taiwan, and the United States have thus
far prevented any diplomatic defections.

China’s approach to COVID-19 diplomacy is
best characterized as semi-coordinated—employing numerous Chinese actors in support of
wide-ranging objectives while also affording
them a degree of autonomy in their outreach.
This decentralized process provided China with
considerable flexibility and visibility when operating in LAC. By deploying on-the-ground
assets in support of China’s diplomatic objectives, China responded in near real-time to developments in the region, changing course as
needed. China’s LAC-based entities also targeted the delivery of numerous, small donations to
specific communities and individuals, in occasional support of broader commercial and political interests, including as concerns Taiwan.
The sheer number of contact points generated
by this strategy also ensured substantial media
coverage and recognition of China’s efforts.
China’s covid-era media campaign was less impactful. Some embassies engaged reluctantly
with Twitter or not at all. Others embraced the
platform and popular “wolf warrior”-type rhetoric but still achieved only limited audiences.
China was nevertheless successful, through a
combination of mask, vaccine, and public diplomacy at avoiding an image crisis at the onset
of the pandemic. Despite deteriorating views of
China in advanced economies, our analysis of
tweets in the LAC region suggests still-mixed
views of China in LAC, similar to pre-pandem-
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ic opinions, as evident in 2019 Pew Research
Center findings.100
China’s approach was also occasionally problematic. Urdinez noted the challenges of coordinating China’s decentralized method, including
occasional miscommunications and diplomatic
blunders.101 In Chile, poor coordination among
Chinese actors resulted in a serious misunderstanding with Chilean officials.102 Courting LAC
officials with PPE kits and vaccines is also a
problematic and potentially corruption-inducing practice. China’s experiment with “wolf warrior”-type messaging may additionally have had
unintended effects, as Yale University’s Daniel
C. Mattingly and James Sundquist have noted.
Wolf warrior diplomacy, they say, has backfired
on numerous occasions.103
Ultimately, this exercise has been an experimental one for China, whether through the
use of an impromptu and often decentralized
aid campaign, the development of new medical technologies, or by employing novel approaches to communications with the region.
China’s approach has supported numerous objectives, whether economic or diplomatic, but
wide-ranging factors will determine the overall
impact of Chinese outreach. These include the
effectiveness of Chinese vaccines and the extent of commitments by partner nations during
the pandemic and after, as LAC prepares for a
period of prolonged economic and social recovery.
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APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLES OF MESSAGING BY CHINESE EMBASSIES IN LAC IN JANUARY
AND FEBRUARY 2020
1/7/2020

Panama

Ambassador to Panama published op-ed noting China’s
international cooperation

H.E. Mr.
Wei Qiang

1/10/2020

Trinidad and
Tobago

Embassy in T&T published a statement from the police
department expressing gratitude for China’s donations and
cooperation in security matters

Chinese
embassy

Ambassador to Panama attends interview with CGTV promoting cooperation with Panama

H.E. Mr.
Wei Qiang

1/11/2020 Panama
1/26/2020

Trinidad and
Tobago

Embassy in T&T hosted a conference, “Human Rights in
Xinjiang: Development and Progress”

Chinese
embassy

1/29/2020

Trinidad and
Tobago

Embassy in T&T published newsletter about China’s
COVID-19 response

Chinese
embassy

1/31/2020 Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in C5N interview

Wang
Xiaolin

1/31/2020 Colombia

Ambassador to Colombia assured public of China’s ability to
control its outbreak in interview

H.E. Mr.
Lan Hu

1/31/2020 El Salvador

Representative of Embassy attended press conference in El
Salvador assuring China’s ability to handle its outbreak

Huang
Kunyu

1/31/2020 Peru

Embassy in Peru published statement defending China
against allegations

Chinese
embassy

1/31/2020 Peru

Ambassador to Peru visited hospital and assured public of
China’s ability to control its outbreak

H.E. Mr.
Liang Yu

Embassy in T&T published newsletter about China’s control
of its outbreak

Chinese
embassy

1/31/2020 Uruguay

Ambassador to Uruguay published op-ed, “Arriba Wuhan,”
supporting Wuhan and assuring China’s ability to control its
outbreak

H.E. Mr.
Wang
Gang

1/31/2020 Uruguay

Embassy in Uruguay published statement defending China
against allegations made by U.S. politicians regarding 5G
and the Belt and Road Initiative

H.E. Mr.
Wang
Gang

1/31/2020

Trinidad and
Tobago

2/1/2020

Antigua and
Barbuda
(A&B)

Chinese ambassador to A&B wrote op-ed in The Observer
about China’s response to COVID-19

H.E. Mr.
Sun Ang

2/1/2020

Dominican
Republic

Ambassador to DR assured of China’s ability to control its
outbreak in op-ed

H.E. Mr.
Zhang Run

2/1/2020

Trinidad and
Tobago

Embassy in T&T published newsletter about China’s control
of its outbreak

Chinese
embassy

2/1/2020

Uruguay

Embassy in Uruguay published Shanghai think tank article,
“Fighting COVID 19: Progress and Insight”

Chinese
embassy

2/2/2020

Colombia

Ambassador to Colombia assured China’s ability to control
its outbreak in op-ed

H.E. Mr.
Lan Hu

2/3/2020

Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in interview

Wang
Xiaolin

2/3/2020

Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in C5N interview

Wang
Xiaolin

2/3/2020

Colombia

Embassy in Colombia published article, “Don’t believe these
lies about COVID” in El Tiempo

Chinese
government
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2/3/2020

Peru

Ambassador to Peru attended interview about China’s investment in Latin America

H.E. Mr.
Liang Yu

2/4/2020

Bolivia

Ambassador to Bolivia held press conference about
COVID-19 response

H.E. Huang
Yazhong

2/4/2020

Brazil

Ambassador to Brazil reassured Brazilian media of China’s
control over its COVID-19 outbreak

H.E. Mr.
Yang Wanming

2/4/2020

Mexico

Ambassador to Mexico published op-ed assuring China’s
ability to control its outbreak, “China toma medidas energicas para combaitr brote de nuevo coronavirus”

H.E. Mr.
Zhu Qingqiao

2/4/2020

Mexico

Ambassador to Mexico appeared in a television interview
H.E. Mr.
assuring China’s control of its outbreak and defending China Zhu Qinagainst various allegations
gqiao

2/4/2020

Trinidad and
Tobago

Embassy in T&T published newsletter referencing China’s
control of its outbreak

Chinese
embassy

2/5/2020

Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in C5N interview

Wang
Xiaolin

2/5/2020

Argentina

Embassy in Argentina published statement defending China

Chinese
embassy

2/5/2020

Colombia

Ambassador to Colombia defended China against allegations and assured China’s ability to control its outbreak in
interview

H.E. Mr.
Lan Hu

2/5/2020

Ecuador

Embassy in Ecuador described China’s COVID-19 response
in press conference

Chinese
government

2/5/2020

Guyana

Embassy in Guyana published an article about China’s ability to control its outbreak

Chinese
embassy

2/5/2020

Panama

Ambassador to Panama attended television interview assur- H.E. Mr.
ing China’s ability to control its outbreak
Wei Qiang

2/5/2020

Trinidad and
Tobago

Embassy in T&T published newsletter about China’s ability
to control its outbreak

Chinese
embassy

2/6/2020

Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in television interview

Wang
Xiaolin

2/6/2020

Brazil

Ambassador to Brazil reassured Brazilian representatives
regarding China’s ability to control its COVID-19 outbreak

H.E. Mr.
Yang Wanming

2/6/2020

Dominican
Republic

Ambassador to DR assured China’s ability to control its outbreak in interview

H.E. Mr.
Zhang Run

2/6/2020

El Salvador

Representative of Embassy attended press conference in El
Salvador supporting China’s handling of the pandemic and
urging people not to blame China

Huang
Kunyu

2/6/2020

Grenada

Ambassador to Grenada hosted press conference ensuring
China’s ability to control its outbreak and its commitment to
transparency

H.E. Mr.
Yongchen
Zhao

2/6/2020

Uruguay

Embassy in Uruguay published article accusing the United
States of sabotaging relations with Uruguay, “China acusa
EEUU de ‘sabotear’ su relacion con Uruguay”

Chinese
embassy

2/7/2020

Costa Rica

Ambassador to Costa Rica supported China’s handling of
the COVID-19 pandemic in La Nación and La Opinión

H.E. Mr.
Tang Heng
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2/7/2020

Ecuador

Ambassador to Ecuador published op-ed regarding China’s
control of the pandemic

H.E. Mr.
Chen
Guoyou

2/7/2020

Guyana

Ambassador to Guyana attended interview supporting
China’s control of its outbreak and addressing any risk to
Guyana

H.E. Mr.
Cui Jianchun

2/7/2020

Peru

Ambassador to Peru attended interview assuring China’s
ability to control its outbreak

H.E. Mr.
Liang Yu

2/8/2020

Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in interview

Wang
Xiaolin

2/8/2020

Argentina

Ambassador to Argentina defended China in op-ed for El
Mundo

H.E. Mr
Zou Xiaoli

2/8/2020

Bolivia

Ambassador to Bolivia pleaded for support from Bolivia in
newspaper interview

H.E. Huang
Yazhong

2/8/2020

Dominican
Republic

Ambassador to DR assured China’s ability to control the
pandemic and urged the public not to believe in press conference rumors

H.E. Mr.
Zhang Run

2/8/2020

Venezuela

Ambassador to Venezuela published op-ed assuring China’s
H.E. Mr. Li
ability to control the pandemic, “China conseguira la victoria
Baorong
contra el coronovirus”

2/9/2020

Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in TN interview

Wang
Xiaolin

2/9/2020

Venezuela

Ambassador to Venezuela published op-ed celebrating Chinese New Year and COVID-19 cooperation

H.E. Mr. Li
Baorong

2/10/2020 Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in C5N interview

Wang
Xiaolin

2/10/2020 Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in Telam interview

Wang
Xiaolin

2/10/2020 Bolivia

Embassy in Bolivia announced solidarity with Chinese covid
victims

Chinese
government

2/10/2020

Dominican
Republic

Embassy in DR forwarded op-ed responding to allegations
against China

Chinese
government

2/10/2020

Trinidad and
Tobago

Ambassador to T&T attended television interview, assuring
China’s ability to control outbreak and noting prospects for
economic recovery

H.E. Mr.
Song
Yumin

2/11/2020 Colombia

Ambassador to Colombia assured China’s ability to control
the pandemic in interview

H.E. Mr.
Lan Hu

2/11/2020 Dominica

Ambassador to Dominica praised China’s friendship with
Dominica in the fight against COVID-19

H.E. Mr. Lu
Kun

2/11/2020 Grenada

Ambassador to Grenada publishes op-ed, “Don’t be afraid,
please trust China’s ability to overcome the pandemic”

H.E. Mr.
Yongchen
Zhao

2/12/2020 Suriname

Embassy in Suriname published statement to thank overseas Chinese for donating PPE and noting China’s full control of its outbreak

Chinese
embassy

2/12/2020 Suriname

Ambassador to Suriname published an op-ed assuring China’s control of the pandemic, “China confident to overcome
the battle against Covid”

H.E. Mr. Liu
Quan
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2/13/2020 Costa Rica

Ambassador to Costa explained China’s handling of the
COVID-19 pandemic in an interview

H.E. Mr.
Tang Heng

2/13/2020 Grenada

Ambassador to Grenada published an article noting China’s
control of its outbreak, “Panic unnecessary, China will prevail over the epidemic”

H.E. Mr.
Yongchen
Zhao

2/13/2020 Panama

Ambassador to Panama assured China’s ability to control its
outbreak in television interview

H.E. Mr.
Wei Qiang

2/14/2020 Colombia

Ambassador to Colombia assured China’s ability to control
the pandemic in interview

H.E. Mr.
Lan Hu

2/14/2020 Panama

Spokesperson to Embassy to Panama participated in television interview about China’s experience with COVID-19

Chinese
embassy

2/14/2020 Peru

Ambassador to Peru attended television interview noting
that China’s economic outlook was not affected by the
pandemic

H.E. Mr.
Liang Yu

2/17/2020 Brazil

Ambassador to Brazil defended China from allegations in
interview with São Paolo newspaper

H.E. Mr.
Yang Wanming

2/17/2020 Colombia

Ambassador to Colombia noted China’s control of the pandemic in an interview

H.E. Mr.
Lan Hu

2/17/2020 Mexico

Ambassador to Mexico appeared in a television interview
assuring China’s ability to control the pandemic and defending China against various allegations

H.E. Mr.
Zhu Qingqiao

Chinese ambassador to A&B wrote an op-ed in The Observer

H.E. Mr
Sun Ang

2/19/2020 Barbados

Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, a Chinese
think tank, published an article on China’s COVID-19 response and prospects

Chinese
think tank

2/20/2020 Colombia

Chinese ambassador to Colombia participated in an interview, assuring the Colombian public of China’s ability to
control the pandemic

H.E. Mr.
Lan Hu

2/20/2020 Panama

Embassy in Panama published letters of support from Pana- Chinese
ma-China friendship associations
embassy

2/20/2020 Panama

Ambassador to Panama attended television interview assurH.E. Mr.
ing China’s ability to control the pandemic and remarking on
Wei Qiang
its economic recovery

2/21/2020 Argentina

Counselor to Argentina interviewed by Good Morning Argentina regarding China’s response to COVID-19

Wang
Xiaolin

2/21/2020 Uruguay

Ambassador to Uruguay referenced China’s control of the
pandemic and its economic cooperation with Uruguay in
interview

H.E. Mr.
Wang
Gang

2/23/2020 Peru

Ambassador to Peru took part in a television interview about H.E. Mr.
China’s economic recovery
Liang Yu

2/25/2020 Argentina

Counselor to Argentina defended China in interview with FM
95.5

Wang
Xiaolin

2/26/2020 Panama

Embassy in Panama published op-ed citing Julio Yao Villalaz’s defense of China against claims that COVID-19
originated there

Chinese
embassy

2/26/2020 Peru

Ambassador to Peru attended television interview and underscored China’s economic cooperation with LAC amid the
pandemic

H.E. Mr.
Liang Yu

2/19/2020
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2/27/2020 Argentina

Ambassador to Argentina wrote op-ed in La Nación about
China’s COVID-19 recovery

H.E. Mr
Zou Xiaoli

2/27/2020 Mexico

Embassy in Mexico hosted press conference assuring China’s ability to control its outbreak and answered questions

Chinese
embassy

2/28/2020 Colombia

Ambassador to Colombia defended China against allegations in television interview

H.E. Mr.
Lan Hu

2/28/2020 Panama

Ambassador to Panama attended conference of supporters
and defended China against “lies from certain politicians”

H.E. Mr.
Wei Qiang

2/29/2020 Argentina

Ambassador to Argentina wrote op-ed in El Cronista regarding China’s COVID-19 response

H.E. Mr
Zou Xiaoli

2/29/2020 Colombia

Ambassador to Colombia assured China’s ability to control
the pandemic in El Tiempo

H.E. Mr.
Lan Hu
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